Bhutan Watch

ABSTRACT

Security threat posed by rising China in Indo-Pacific region has raised fear of possible shift in the world order – that had remained under tight fist of the United States for over a century. China is flexing its economic and military muscles that is likely to substitute America’s dominance in international politics. As China crawls into Asia Pacific region, the US has unveiled its new strategy to counter the rise of Communist China. Regional allies and stronger security relation are of paramount importance for this strategy to succeed. This paper examines what Indo-Pacific Strategy means for South Asia and Bhutan in particular. How this tiny Himalayan Kingdom would play its role and what are possible advantages? It also includes the role of India in courting Bhutan into the bigger international gambit to surround China and what India and US must do jointly to ensure the success of the strategies.

Key words: communism, democracy, diplomacy, military, politics, strategies, Indo-pacific

Introduction

While unveiling Indo-Pacific Strategies in 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said “American people and the whole world have a stake in the Indo-Pacific’s peace and prosperity. It’s why the Indo-Pacific must be free and open (Hartman, 2019).” US state department describes this statement as ‘an ironclad and enduring commitment’ (US State Department, Office of the Assistant Secretary, 2018)  to the region.

The strategy basically targets creating more democratic and open society in Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s undemocratic growing influence. Bhutan is small country but can be a major player under this flagship strategy within the Indian domain. India’s involvement in engaging Bhutan on this strategic initiative of the US government is of paramount important. The initiative must not ignore the undemocratic behaviours of Bhutan government– past and present.

India is not an alien when it comes to the Bhutanese refugee issue. For decades, a democratic country aligned with an absolute monarchy to curb the voice for democratic change. India remained silent when voices for democratic change rippled southern Bhutan.

We have explicitly observed that current political changes in Bhutan would not have been possible without India’s push. India had not been ready to support the anti-establishment forces but in recent decades positioned itself in favour of a democratic governance in Bhutan and in the region.

As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi consolidates his political position within the country and in international stage, Bhutanese in exile can expect a better outcome. His influence would be greater than any previous Indian political leaders. India and Bhutan have repeatedly avowed to keep the bilateral relation as strong as it was, yet PM Modi’s challenges remain intact to ensure growing anti-India sentiments in Bhutan would not distract his mission. India’s relation with Bhutan will grow stronger at peoples’ level and resolution of Bhutanese refugee is a part of this equation. India’s relation with Bhutan heavily relies on cultural connection with southern Bhutan. It will glorify image of PM Modi if his government takes steps to resolve the Bhutanese refugee crisis and help Bhutan for stability and peace in long run.

Modi’s delivery test

Ram Mandir in Ayodhya remained the critical issue in Indian political gambit. None of the Indian political clans ever attempted to provide a solution to this age-old dispute. PM Modi had thrown himself into the fire ever since he become Chief Minister of Gujrat. It nearly tarnished his image in the western world when he become prime minister in 2014. However, he steered the politics and secured a win for his Hindutva campaign.

Kashmir was another boiling pot of India’s internal dispute since independence. PM Modi tactically secured multiple benefit for Kashmir bifurcation. PM Modi managed to provide a solution to conflicting politics of Kashmir that will hopefully bring peace. He technically opened floodgates for Hindus in Kashmir and politically diminished Pakistan’s infiltration into the region.

All these had not been possible without a strong will power and political vision of PM Modi. These few actions he mustered provide hopes that he has courage to do things if he wishes.

Bhutanese refugee issues

I can draw some similarities with PM Modi on my life experiences. Modi came from a background that I had experienced. The tea I drink every morning has a greater connection with PM Modi. I believe he looks back into his young life and his experiences when it comes to addressing problems that common people like me and my fellow countrymen face. I trust he draws lessons from his struggling youth age when he sees the uncertain future of young people still living in refugee camps. As a head of government that has critical role in securing peace and stability in the region, PM Modi bears the onus to address Bhutanese refugee issue. He has the power, efficiency and authority to resolve the crisis. The international community concerned on this issue rely on India as Bhutan’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by New Delhi. New Delhi’s interest will be Bhutan’s too.

There have been several occasions when international rights groups and advocates call for India to take action. India was sharply criticised for ignoring voice of those calling for democratic changes. Balancing act from India was sensitive. Acting against the interest of those in Thimphu would have certainly pushed Bhutan out of India’s hand. The refugee leadership had not attained this maturity to address the sensitivity of India’s political interest. Additionally, Bhutanese leadership in exile made only futile efforts to engage with the Indian leadership to explain their cause and gain Delhi’s confidence.

India may be a major factor in Bhutanese refugee solution, yet Bhutan is the central force. Even then, I would not play a blame game with Bhutan. The rebels of Bhutan (whom RGOB tagged anti-nationals or terrorist) also have made some blunders. These actions would come on table when we talk of a durable and peaceful solution. India had initially provided informal support by ignoring the rebel camps in Garganda. The Bhutanese refugee leadership failed to tap the opportunity and received Delhi’s confidence but in some instances engaged in such actions that reflect very undemocratic and inhumane culture.

State party must always take greater responsibility in any wrongdoing, even if the rebels have made mistakes. When we seek Indian support to resolve refugee imbroglio, the refugee leadership in exile must be standby to accept their mistakes. Solution of the crisis is to forget the past and plan for future. Learn from those mistakes to ensure ethnic tensions would not jeopardise national integrity.

RGOB must spell first its good intentions to take back those remaining in camps and willing to repatriate. The Lhotsampas still in Bhutan have high expectation from their new monarch King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuk. These 6500 refugees remaining in camps would disappear in big Bhutanese population. They are certainly not threat to Bhutan’s national security. When it comes to solution proposal from RGOB, India is very unlikely to put conditions or reservation. Afterall, it’s a matter between Bhutanese citizens and their government.

Bhutan and the strategies

The strategic initiative may be grandeur covering billions in population and geographical area. Countries like India, Australia, Japan may have visible roles yet a small country like Bhutan should not be ignored based on its size. Strategic location of the country means Bhutan may have more important role to play compared to other member countries. South Asia is centrifugal operation base and historical ties between the United States and India make it easy to implement Indo Pacific Strategies in the region.

Bhutan is within the Indian domain. International diplomatic communication with Bhutan is not accessible without Indian approval.

The Indo Pacific Strategies Report (US State Department, 2019) released by Department of State says ‘the continuity of our shared strategic vision is uninterrupted despite an increasingly complex security environment. Inter-state strategic competition, defined by geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary concern for US national security. In particular, the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernisation, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations”.

China’s influence in the region is ever increasing along with its economic and military power. Several reports have raised concerns about China’s debt trap that smaller developing countries in the region have fallen into. It is important for the United States and India in the region to make sure that small countries will be able to protect their sovereignty in the long run through development in infrastructures and cross security training programmes.

The new report (US State Department, 2019) of the US Department of State stresses co-operation in additional sectors such as economics, military, technology or energy. The report reads “Asia EDGE and related programmes build on longstanding US energy technical assistance in the region. These programs have mobilised $806 million in public and private investment across 11 renewable energy projects in Indonesia, including developing its power grid and first wind farm, and helped the Indonesian government integrate energy conservation targets into its 20-year electricity general plan. They have helped increase the capacity for cross-border electricity trade between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Asia EDGE worked with regulators to draft Nepal’s Energy Regulatory Commission Act, which facilitates energy sector regulation. It also supported the adoption of flexible resources, such as gas and batteries, needed to integrate renewables through the US-India Clean Energy Finance Task Force.”

This recent report clearly shows the importance of Bhutan and Nepal in the Indo Pacific planning. Bhutan has opportunity of cashing the benefits of this offer to its economic development by improving its international trade and building infrastructure. Bhutan’s engagement in the initiative also helps to boost its political profile and open doors for expanding its long unfilled dreams of expanding diplomatic relations.

Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan had visited Bhutan in August 2019 to invite Bhutan to actively engage in this bigger international initiative to ensure political balance in the region. Being guided by India on foreign relations, Bhutan is very likely to hold consultation with its southern neighbour on the issue. Foreign Minister Tandin Dorji’s recent visit to India was part of the consultation process. India and Bhutan have increased their engagement in bilateral discussions in recent years to discuss pros and cons of engaging in this bigger political gambit. US has also increased its direct engagement with Bhutan.

The Doklam standoff is one major issue that is telling Bhutan to revisit its strategic stand on national security and sovereignty. China sought to normalise relations (Market Research Journal, not dated) with Bhutan following the event yet the differences continue to remain. Bhutan requires stronger military to defend its border encroachment in the north. Modern Bhutanese military in its current incarnation came into existence with Indian support in 1951 following China’s absorption of Tibet. Bhutan stood by New Delhi’s loss during India China War in 1962 (Dutta, 2017) and inconclusive result of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War (Vij, 2105) raised question about India’s ability to ensure Bhutan’s sovereignty. China has not stopped its assertion to claim Bhutan even after absorption of significant area in Gasa district. Doklam push (Philip, 2019) was China’s anther gamble to undermine Bhutan’s sovereignty.

Indo-Pacific strategy give alternative to security in Bhutan’s border. The strategies improve India’s capacity to counter anti-democratic moves in the region. It strengthens Bhutan borders to some extent. Bhutan will have opportunity to improve and modernise the military facilities, hold defence trainings and strengthen intelligence. Bhutan must walk the talk with India to support Indo-Pacific strategy implementation in the region.

US-Bhutan relation

Bhutan does not have direct diplomatic relation with the United States. ‘Although Bhutan and the United States have never established formal diplomatic relations, the two countries maintain warm, informal relations via the US Embassy in New Delhi, India, and Bhutan’s Mission to the United Nations in New York. Bhutanese officials and military officers have attended courses at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.’

US is not pushing for a formal diplomatic relation with Bhutan at this stage (Press Trust of India, 2015).  And Bhutan had formally announced that it will not have diplomatic relations with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

However, going by the recent developments, Bhutan will immensely benefit from having diplomatic relations with the United States (Ferraro, 2015). Having a formal embassy or at least a consulate in Thimphu will be a great leap forward for Bhutan-US relations. US presence in Bhutan means a greater defence of Bhutan’s northern borders from Chinese aggression. India will have a better partner in monitoring ever-increasing Chinese border encroachment. Hopefully, Bhutan and India will not have to see a second Doklam standoff that had challenged the Indian capability in Bhutan.

US diplomatic presence in Bhutan will also help quell the increasing anti-India sentiments in Bhutanese society. US-India joint presence in Bhutan must be for peace and security rather than on meddling in the national political affairs and pushing country into instability.

Concurrently, the Bhutan mission in the New York must also be upgraded into an embassy to deal with bilateral relations with the US. This will improve Bhutan’s relation with its Diaspora in the US that has grown  big now. A Bhutanese diplomatic mission in Washington will enjoy an added advantage of building relations with its Diaspora and invite them for economic and technological development of the country through monetary and expertise contribution.

IPS and peace in Bhutan

The strategy must facilitate normalising ethnic tensions in Bhutan. Bhutan has remained a multi-ethnic nation for centuries. But it was also marred by several ethnic clashes. Bhutan has kept the situation under control through suppressive measures but failed to indoctrinate the importance of having a peaceful society through dialogue and democratic practices. Despite political changes in the country following abdication by Fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuk in 2006, the ethnic cohesion has not improved to facilitate growth and maturity of budding democracy.

IPS includes strengthening democracy. But it should also strengthen inclusive democracy, equality and fair political representation in governance. This will ensure peace, stability, equality and sovereignty of Bhutan and its neighbours. 

Conclusion

Indo-Pacific Strategies may have bigger value, geography and wider vision to stop China’s influence in the region. Bhutan may be a drop in ocean, yet countries sharing border with China plays vital role in ensuring effective implementation of the initiative. Bhutan has objected to be included in China’s most ambitious economic diplomatic push Belt and Road Initiative and this status must continue despite push from the north for greater financial benefits. US’s primary vision through IPS may be to stop China from taking over it’s role in leading the world political order but there are larger benefits Bhutan can reap from this. US must be ready to address all troubles Bhutan and Bhutanese are currently facing if it wants Bhutan in its allies. India is a lead in South Asia and biggest strategic partner the US to implement the initiative. Bhutan fits within the Indian arms but remains a very sensitive and important factor for success of the US mega plan.

References

Hartman, L (23 September 2019). What is the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy?. Share America. Retrieved December 2019 from https://share.america.gov/what-is-u-s-indo-pacific-strategy/

US State Department, Office of the Assistant Secretary (7 December 2018). U.S. Assistant Secretary Manisha Singh and Republic of Korea Vice Foreign Minister Lee Taeho Hold Talks on Strengthening Economic Cooperation (media note). Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/u-s-assistant-secretary-manisha-singh-and-republic-of-korea-vice-foreign-minister-lee-taeho-hold-talks-on-strengthening-economic-cooperation/

US State Department (4 November 2019). A free and open Indo-Pacific: advancing a shared vision. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf

Officials from China visit Bhutan after Doklam standoff, discuss border dispute (undated). Market Research Journal. Retrieved from  https://marketresearchjournals.com/2019/11/18/officials-from-china-visit-bhutan-after-doklam-standoff-discuss-border-dispute/

Dutta, P K (20 October 2017). This day in 1962: China-India war started with synchronised attack on Ladakh, Arunachal. India Today. Retrieved from  https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-war-1962-20-october-aksai-chin-nefa-arunchal-pradesh-1067703-2017-10-20

Vij, S (27 August 2015). Why neither India nor Pakistan won the 1965 war. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/why-neither-india-nor-pakistan-won-the-1965-war/a-18677930

Philip, S A (7 October 2019). China & Bhutan close to striking Doklam deal, holding line could become working boundary. The Print. Retrieved. https://theprint.in/defence/china-bhutan-close-to-striking-doklam-deal-holding-line-could-become-working-boundary/302273/

Press Trust of India (18 Jan 2015). No plan to establish diplomatic ties with Bhutan: US. The Economic Times. Retrieved from  https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/no-plan-to-establish-diplomatic-ties-with-bhutan-us/articleshow/45929759.cms

  Ferraro, M F (22 December 2014). The Case for Stronger Bhutanese-American Ties. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-case-for-a-stronger-bhutanese-american-relationship/

 Mann, J (2 May 2014). Why Narendra Modi Was Banned From the U.S. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-narendra-modi-was-banned-from-the-u-s-1399062010 The Department of Defense (1 June 2019). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: preparedness, partnerships and promoting a networked region. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/department-of-defense-indo-pacific-strategy-report-2019.pdf

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[1]Harrisburg, PA