The Gelephu Mindfulness City (GMC) is established as an independent entity with executive, legislative and judiciary independence. The city is unlikely to have political independence though. The ‘one country, two systems’ which is rarely practiced around the world except for the case of Hong Kong and Macau when they were returned to China from colonial powers. While these two territories were returning to their homeland from foreign rule, the GMC proposition is the other way round – Bhutan wants to separate Gelephu from its conservative rule and give some autonomy. In Hong Kong and Macau, the civil society had practiced the democratic exercise and enjoyed civil liberties which were essential to maintain the social fabric upon their return to China. In Gelephu, residents have not lived to adopt liberal thoughts or nurture the culture of democracy. This basic difference will determine the success of a ‘one country, two system’ test in Bhutan. Read full
The GeSAR represents a groundbreaking initiative with executive, legal, and policy autonomy. Established by a Royal Charter issued in February 2024, the GeSAR operates under a unique legal framework. While Bhutan’s Constitution does not explicitly provide for SARs, Article 2, Section 16e grants the King prerogatives for actions not covered by existing laws, legitimising the SAR’s creation to some extent. The Local Government Act 2009, which governs local administrations, does not envision an SAR, suggesting the GMC operates outside current legal structures. Parliamentary approval was bypassed and national referendum was not deemed appropriate. This article shall look into constitutional, legal and other operational hurdles in the GMC realisation. Read full
Tshering Tobgay - new prime minister who will take over the interim government
Globally, interim governments function as transitional entities managing governance during crises or regime transitions, facilitating the shift towards a stable governance structure. Their roles include supervising elections, maintaining law and order, addressing immediate socio-political challenges, fostering reconciliation, and upholding democratic values. In Bhutan, these bodies rectify political deviations, reconnect to autocratic governance norms, and transition selective authority to the succeeding government. During this transition phase, the interim governments orchestrate conditions conducive to a particular party’s success in the later election, thus influencing the forthcoming government’s composition. Read full
Tshering Tobgay - new prime minister who will take over the interim government
Bhutanese refugee camp
The Bhutanese state has constructed their identity, domestically and internationally, against the Lhotshampa people, a broadly Hindu Bhutanese-Nepali people, who feature as the ‘Other’ in the process of identity construction. This group of marginalised people has been expelled from Bhutan through ethnic cleansing. The monarchy and ruling elite see the Lhotshampa as a threat to their power and have imposed policies designed to homogenise Bhutan. We explore this Bhutanese construction of identity. Through the case studies of Bhutanese-Nepalese and Bhutanese-Lhotshampa relations, we review the literature on both ‘critical’ and ‘conventional’ constructivism with focus on identity in the domestic and international spheres. The primary question of investigation is to what extent theorists can reconcile critical and conventional constructivism through the case study of Bhutanese national identity and the type of insights that gives us into the nation of Bhutan and its identity. We attempt to reconcile two complementary but ontologically differing theories through a pragmatic approach. Constructivist theorists in the realm of identity are deployed to explain how the Bhutanese government has acted. We find that through Bhutan, a pragmatic approach can be taken to partially reconcile the constructivisms to understand identity domestically and internationally. The findings suggest identity is central to Bhutan exercising its sovereignty, to the detriment of the Lhotshampa. The government claims homogeneity at home, providing a domestic base of control to pursue international interests; interests which reinforce that identity of homogeneity. Read in full
Bhutanese refugee camp
Bhutan is graduating from Least Developing Country (LDC) status in 2023. It was granted LDC status in 1971. Bhutan has maintained fair political stability, consistent economic growth, and improved social indicators in the last few decades. However, Bhutan’s graduation comes amid the worst economic blow by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pillars of growth have been shattered but the plan for graduation is unlikely to be extended. Bhutan has not met a few criteria under the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) while it has fulfilled other criteria. The graduation is expected to cause no major impact on Bhutan due to its economic reliance (in both grants and trade) on a single country (India). Bhutan has low volume trade with third countries. Yet a sensible amount of grants, funds and market access will be lost that may challenge Bhutan’s continued economic growth and economic prosperity. This article investigates the process, progress, and challenges of the country after it attains the status of a developing nation. Read full
Introduction In a new ‘democratic’ Bhutan, a lady’s failed attempt to overthrow the army chief and influence the highest authority in the county’s legal system raised questions if the country has the capacity to deter future conspiracies that could be complicated and sophisticated than this. The story received massive public attention and stirred inconclusive debates purely because the country has liberalised politics and media industry, though in miniature form, exist. Many stories of this nature vanished in history and have become folklores. The latest scandal would have much bigger implications in public psychology had it been not shadowed by the COVID 19 pandemic. The story revolves around four individuals – Bomden Khandu Wangmo, former Royal Bodyguard (RBG) Commandant Brigadier Thinley Tobgay, Supreme Court Justice Kuenlay Tshering (Elephant Bench or Bench 1) and Pemagatshel District Judge Yeshey Dorji. The Thimphu District Court on 23 July sentenced these four individuals to a prison term ranging from five years to 10 years. Chief Operations Officer Batoo Tshering with RBG Commandment Thinley Tobgay The charge sheet of the Office of Attorney General (OAG) mentions, ‘as the offenses committed by the defendants are highly sensitive, grievous, most serious in nature and detrimental to the very core of national security, peace and sovereignty of the country, they must be given the maximum sentencing’. Though total sentences pronounced against them are much longer, the court agreed for concurrent sentences and some of them can pay Thrimthue[1] in lieu of imprisonment for certain offences and charges. Lead Lady The story revolves around Khandu Wangmo – a lady who whirled power in disguise in such a sophisticated way that caused a major stir in the national security and judiciary. Wangmo, 41, from Thimphu, started her career as an English teacher in Drukgyel School in Paro but left the profession early on. She worked in the Indian Embassy in Thimphu as a Social Secretary cum Liaison Officer between 2012 and 2016.…
ABSTRACT What was the need of the Orange Army with strength more than that of the Royal Bhutan Army or the Royal Bhutan Police? The Orange Army called De-Suung (Organisation) and Desuup (members) established in 2010 on the auspicious of the King’s thirtieth birthday is now the largest force in the country with more than 18,000 permanent members from all walks of life and all corners of the country. Formed on the principle of volunteerism, the Orange Army is dedicated to crowd control, rescue and operation during emergencies, takes up the role of alert citizens. Now, it is the fastest-growing organisation in the country. Its formation and functioning are outside the expectation of the constitution. However, the King who is the guardian of the constitution and the supreme commander in chief of armed forces and militia is also the supreme commander of this extra-constitutional Orange Army. While the King needs a recommendation from the Prime Minister to command the army and police, the government has no control over the Orange Army, formed and run by the King who commands it directly. The Orange Army is now running a parallel government and is growing incredibly popular among the citizens most of whom are not happy with the democratic parliamentary system in the country and victims of calamities. There is no mechanism to check the cankerous Orange Army if it walks the way of SAVAK, Gestapo, Ku Klux Klan, or the Yakuza except the formation of another extra-constitutional institution to counter it. Keywords: calamities, secret agency, totalitarian, volunteerism, militia, security Read Complete Article
ABSTRACT The uprising of 1990 in Bhutan was a wake-up call for the Bhutanese monarchy to reform. The King announced in 2005 that the country will have a ‘democratic’ government. He handed over his authority to his son to govern. The King and the country received a massive appreciation for initiating democracy. By nature, democracy should primarily benefit those who demanded it. Instead, Bhutan is the only democracy in the world where pro-democracy activists are still serving jail sentences. The international community remains a mute spectator to the sugar-coated Bhutanese democracy. Bhutan fooled them by taking advantage of their interest in geopolitics. This paper shall look at the story of dissidents behind bars, their families and response from the international community – including governments, human rights groups and the United Nations. Additionally, the major highlights of this paper will be to examine the implementation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution of Bhutan and to see if such fundamental rights as enshrined in the constitution are real or a toothless instrument. Keywords: political prisoners, democracy, human rights, politics, justice, Read Complete Article
Repatriation is not just a physical return to ‘home’ but a complex political process. With the deadlock of repatriation, resettlement came to be the only practical solution to most of the Bhutanese refugees, which weakened the repatriation movement in the sense both local integration and third-country resettlement couldn’t be a durable solution. Bhutanese refugees faced severe pain in exile, got international attention when they began efforts of repatriation. After the peace marches to Bhutan failed in 1996 & 2007, repatriation voices got gradually muted an activist-less eloquent. The repatriation persuaders (the eloquent and visible leaders) excluding few exceptions chose the third-country resettlement and disappeared from the activism. A paucity of unified permanent persuaders weakened the vibrancy of the repatriation movement. For restoring the vitality of activism, the repatriation movement of Bhutanese refugees anticipates permanent persuaders as a historic necessity to a logical conclusion. Keywords: Hegemony, refugee, resistance, repatriation, resettlement Read Complete Article
Bhutan and China have landed into fresh border dispute – this time quietly in an international forum, details of which have started coming out only recently, bit by bit. Indian media have been quick to pick the issue articulating this to be another indirect pressure on India. The Bhutan-China border dispute has emerged amidst the heightened tension along Indo-China border. Context UN’s Global Environment Facility had its virtual meeting in the beginning of last month to approve several grants related to climate change and environmental preservation. The GEF Council discussed and approved USD 5.4m grant application put forth by Bhutan for biodiversity in Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in the eastern district of Trashigang. China opposed the proposal and did not join the council decision. China claimed that Sakteng was a disputed border region and as such funding should not be approved. Despite China’s objection Bhutan secured the grant funding. Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary The GEF had allocated funds for this sanctuary in the past but China had never raised any objection or mentioned it to be an area of border dispute. Bhutan for the first time went hard against Chinese assertion. Despite ceding a large area in the Gasa district to China, the northern communist nation did not stop border encroachment. Failing to see any intention of the communist regime in resolving the disputes, Bhutan technically started ignoring border talks. When this latest episode hit Bhutan in an international forum, the Himalayan nation formally dispatched demarche to Chinese embassy in New Delhi to express its objection on new Chinese stance. Without formal diplomatic relations, China and Bhutan communicate through their embassies based in New Delhi. Bhutanese objection The diplomatic note is not publicly available, yet Indian media quote sources saying Bhutan objected China’s position and clarified Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary is an integral and sovereign territory of Bhutan. According to the GEF Council Chairman’s summary released on June 16, of the virtual meeting…